Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of equipping fully autonomous robotic weapons with the capacity to kill. Current ideas concerning the feasibility and advisability of developing and deploying such weapons, including the proposal that they be equipped with a so-called “ethical governor”, are reviewed and critiqued. The perspective adopted for this study includes software engineering practice as well as ethical and legal aspects of the use of lethal autonomous robotic weapons. Design/methodology/approach – In the (...) paper, the author survey and critique the applicable literature. Findings – In the current paper, the author argue that fully autonomous robotic weapons with the capacity to kill should neither be developed nor deployed, that research directed toward equipping such weapons with a so-called “ethical governor” is immoral and serves as an “ethical smoke-screen” to legitimize research and development of these weapons and that, as an ethical duty, engineers and scientists should condemn and refuse to participate in their development. Originality/value – This is a new approach to the argument for banning autonomous lethal robotic weapons based on classical work of Joseph Weizenbaum, Helen Nissenbaum and others. (shrink)

In this paper my aim is to get clearer on what eliminative materialism actually does and does not entail. I look closely at one cluster of views that is often described as a form of eliminativism in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science and try to show that this characterization is a mistake. More specifically, I look at conceptions of eliminativism recently endorsed by writers such as Edouard Machery, Paul Griffiths, Valerie Hardcastle and others, and argue that although these views do (...) endorse the elimination of something, they offer only what I will call a sort of category dissolution, and should be treated as something altogether different from traditional eliminativism. Spelling out the main contrast between eliminative materialism proper and this alternative view, and defending the need to keep them distinct, is my primary objective. As I show, a central irony is that proponents of the problematic outlook often insist that divergent things should not be classified together under a single label. By characterizing their own views as a form of eliminativism, they commit a fundamental error that they themselves argue should not be made. While my focus here is on eliminative materialism, the error I intend to highlight appears across various discussions about alleged eliminativism of all sorts of things. (shrink)

The wave function of quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of the dispositional role it plays in the dynamics of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional spacetime). There is more than one way, however, of specifying its dispositional role. This paper considers Suárez’s theory of ‘Bohmian dispositionalism’, in which the particles are endowed with their own ‘Bohmian dispositions’, and Simpson’s theory of ‘Cosmic Hylomorphism’, in which the particle configuration comprises a hylomorphic substance which has an intrinsic (...) power. I argue that Bohmian dispositionalism fails to capture intuitively correct counterfactuals about what would happen in Small Worlds which have only a small number of particles, but that this problem is avoided by Cosmic Hylomorphism, in which the cosmic power manifests a teleological process. (shrink)

Cognitive representation is the single most important explanatory notion in the sciences of the mind and has served as the cornerstone for the so-called 'cognitive revolution'. This book critically examines the ways in which philosophers and cognitive scientists appeal to representations in their theories, and argues that there is considerable confusion about the nature of representational states. This has led to an excessive over-application of the notion - especially in many of the fresher theories in computational neuroscience. Representation Reconsidered shows (...) how psychological research is actually moving in a non-representational direction, revealing a radical, though largely unnoticed, shift in our basic understanding of how the mind works. (shrink)

Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that purports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Contrary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles that follow continuous trajectories through space.

Research on this topic in Europe and North America has reached a new stage. Prior to 1970, historians told a story of progress in which modern individuals gradually gained mastery of emotions. After 1970 this older approach was put into doubt. Since 1990 research into the history of emotions has increasingly relied on a new methodology, based on the assumption that emotion is a domain of effort, and that it is possible to document variance between emotional standards, on the one (...) hand, and the greater or lesser success of individuals in conforming to them, on the other. Emotional standards are now assumed to display a history that is not progressive, but reflects distinctive features of each period. (shrink)

The primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics seeks to account for quantum phenomena in terms of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space and a law of nature that describes its temporal development. This approach to explaining quantum phenomena is compatible with either a Humean or powerist account of laws. In this paper, I offer a powerist ontology in which the law is specified by Bohmian mechanics for a global configuration of particles. Unlike in other powerist ontologies, however, this law (...) is not grounded in a structural power that is instantiated by the global configuration. Instead, I combine the primitive ontology approach with Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism to create a new metaphysical model, in which the cosmos is a hylomorphic substance with an intrinsic power to choreograph the trajectories of the particles. (shrink)

The last two decades have seen two significant trends emerging within the philosophy of science: the rapid development and focus on the philosophy of the specialised sciences, and a resurgence of Aristotelian metaphysics, much of which is concerned with the possibility of emergence, as well as the ontological status and indispensability of dispositions and powers in science. Despite these recent trends, few Aristotelian metaphysicians have engaged directly with the philosophy of the specialised sciences. Additionally, the relationship between fundamental Aristotelian concepts—such (...) as "hylomorphism", "substance", and "faculties"—and contemporary science has yet to receive a critical and systematic treatment. _Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science _aims to fill this gap in the literature by bringing together essays on the relationship between Aristotelianism and science that cut across interdisciplinary boundaries. The chapters in this volume are divided into two main sections covering the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of the life sciences. Featuring original contributions from distinguished and early-career scholars, this book will be of interest to specialists in analytical metaphysics and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary begins the acclaimed work undertaken by the author, later completed in the second (1988) volume on Aristotle's Rhetoric. The first Commentary on the Rhetoric in more than a century, it is not likely to be superseded for at least another hundred years.

Sullivan and Kymlicka seek to provide an alternative to post-9/11 pessimism about the ability of serious ethical dialogue to resolve disagreements and conflict across national, religious, and cultural differences. It begins by acknowledging the gravity of the problem: on our tightly interconnected planet, entire populations look for moral guidance to a variety of religious and cultural traditions, and these often stiffen, rather than soften, opposing moral perceptions. How, then, to set minimal standards for the treatment of persons while developing moral (...) bases for coexistence and cooperation across different ethical traditions? The Globalization of Ethics argues for a tempered optimism in approaching these questions. Its distinguished contributors report on some of the most globally influential traditions of ethical thought in order to identify the resources within each tradition for working toward consensus and accommodation among the ethical traditions that shape the contemporary world. (shrink)

Roman Frigg and others have developed a general epistemological argument designed to cast doubt on the capacity of a broad range of mathematical models to generate “decision relevant predictions.” In this article, we lay out the structure of their argument—an argument by analogy—with an eye to identifying points at which certain epistemically significant distinctions might limit the force of the analogy. Finally, some of these epistemically significant distinctions are introduced and defended as relevant to a great many of the predictive (...) mathematical modeling projects employed in contemporary climate science. (shrink)

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1986.

Rosa Calcaterra has written an extremely learned and thoughtful book about Richard Rorty’s controversial neopragmatism. It is a worthy addition to the growing number of works that offer a more generous and balanced assessment of Rorty’s thought, in contrast to the scores of highly critical treatments it received during his career. But, as Calcaterra insists, her book is “not an apology for Rorty” (Calcaterra 2019: ix); she critically approaches what she calls Rorty’s philosophical “provocatio...

In Dyskolos, produced in 316 B.C.E., Menander implied his support for Demetrios of Phaleron and the Macedonian-backed oligarchy Demetrios headed as Epimelētēs. The play's mixed-class marriages involved only families that remained enfranchised under the oligarchy's wealth requirement. Thus, they did not indicate support for democratic egalitarianism, but citizen solidarity under the oligarchy. The play's ethical theme, epimeleia, solicitous care of those in need, implied support for the Epimelētēs personally. Knemon's rage evoked the mob that had condemned the previous oligarch Phokion (...) in 318. Knemon's subsequent catastrophe warned the dēmos that they must acquiesce in Macedonian hegemony. (shrink)

This philosophical study addresses the implications of the legal case Stratechuk v. Board of Education, ruling that a policy prohibiting the performance of religious-themed holiday music did not violate the United States Constitution. Two questions are investigated: the differences between the classroom study and public performance of religious music, and the study of holiday music as a subgenre of religious music. Conclusions suggest that a school policy delineating between the rehearsal and performance of sacred music fails to appreciate the interrelationship (...) of these musical practices. While this type of policy attempts to resolve controversy by moving sacred music out of public performance spaces it does not succeed in addressing the underlying philosophical tensions involved in the curricular use of sacred music. Further, a policy that allows the musical celebration of only secular aspects of particular holidays unnecessarily privileges secular over religious meanings and thus limits students’ contextual understanding of the holiday. The academic performance of sacred music within the comprehensive study of a given holiday should not constitute an endorsement of particular religious beliefs, or violate an appropriate position of religious neutrality. (shrink)

_Expanding Curriculum Theory, Second Edition_ carries through the major focus of the original volume—to reflect on the influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of "lines of flight" and its application to curriculum theorizing. What is different is that the lines of flight have since shifted and produced expanded understandings of this concept for curriculum theory and for education in general. This edition reflects the impact of events that have contributed to this shift, in particular the logic of school policy changes (...) and reforms in the past decade, and the continued explosion of social media and its effect on the collective understanding of how both "knowledge" and "education" work as forms of repression. The introduction updates the text and puts it into current debates in the field and in the larger socio-economic milieu. New dis/positions are presented that explore central questions circulating within and outside curriculum studies. Exciting scholarship on a range of topics includes notions of desire and commodities, youth culture and violence, new directions in curriculum theory, Eco-Ethical consciousness, new Deleuzian views of normality, the diffusion of technology and lines of flight in transnational curriculum inquiry. (shrink)

As a retired professor, I join in the growing concerns among educators, and others, about plagiarism, especially now that AI tools like ChatGPT are so readily available. However, I feel more caution is needed, regarding temptations to rely on supposed automatic detection tools, like Turnitin, to solve the problems. Students can be unfairly accused if such tools are used unreflectingly. The Toronto Star's online version of this published Op Ed is available at the link shown below. The version attached here (...) is a pre-print, which also includes annotations for my references, which are not displayed in the published version. (shrink)

The “problem of emotions,” that is, that many of them are both meaningful and corporeal, has yet to be resolved. Western thinkers, from Augustine to Descartes to Zajonc, have handled this problem by employing various forms of mind–body dualism. Some psychologists and neuroscientists since the 1970s have avoided it by talking about cognitive and emotional “processing,” using a terminology borrowed from computer science that nullifies the meaningful or intentional character of both thought and emotion. Outside the Western-influenced contexts, emotion and (...) thought are not seen as distinct kinds of things. Here a solution of sorts is proposed by thinking of emotional expression as a dynamic activity that declares and stirs emotions at the same time. As such, its dynamism may help historians to understand the dramatic changes and trends they investigate. (shrink)

William M. Epstein charges that most current social welfare programs are not held to credible standards in their design or their results. Rather than spending less on such research and programs, however, Epstein suggests we should spend much more, and do the job right. The American public and policymakers need to rely on social science research for objective, credible information when trying to solve problems of employment, affordable housing, effective health care, and family integrity. But, Epstein contends, politicians treat (...) welfare issues as ideological battlegrounds; they demand immediate results from questionable data and implement policies long before social researchers can complete their analyses. Social scientists often play into the political agenda, supporting poorly conceived programs and doing little to test and revise them. Analyzing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the recent welfare reform act, Food Stamps, Medicaid, job training, social services, and other programs, Epstein systematically challenges the conservative’s vain hope that neglect is therapeutic for the poor, as well as the liberal’s conceit that a little bit of assistance is sufficient. (shrink)

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The AJP Best Article Prize WinnerWilliam M. Breichner, Journals PublisherTHE AJP BEST ARTICLE PRIZE FOR 2021 HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY TO ERIKA VALDIVIESOYALE UNIVERSITYfor her contribution to scholarship in “Dissecting a Forgery,” AJP 142.3 (Fall 2021): 493–533.Valdivieso conclusively demonstrates that Exsul Immeritus, a letter in an Italian collection attributed to the mestizo Jesuit Blas Valera and dated by some to the 17th century, is (...) a forgery written in the second half of the 20th century. Using philological tools—close linguistic analysis and source criticism—Valdivieso makes a decisive contribution to the field of colonial Latin American history. Yet the article is irresistible for scholars of classical antiquity as well, engaging as it does with ungrammatical Latin, Italianisms, and a patchwork of citations from Roman authors, the Vulgate, and the Latin works of Dante, Ficino, and Politian. Valdivieso shows that the letter depends on critical editions and compilations that were not available until much later, establishing a terminus post quem of 1952. The article raises tantalizing questions about the provenance and validation of the whole collection.Although Valdivieso is not the first scholar to claim that the letter is a forgery, she is the first to pay close attention to the Latin. If authentic, the letter would provide otherwise unattested information about the textual transmission of Petronius and Dante as well as Valera’s life and works. The letter also makes claims that subordinate indigenous accounts to Valera’s own and alter what we know about the Incas and the Spanish conquest of Peru. Valdivieso demonstrates masterful control of different fields of study while captivating and educating the reader at every stage.With its acute and highly engaging philological detective work, clarity, and critical service to other disciplines, Valdivieso’s article is a prime example of the vitality of new directions in classical philology. Rigorous and compelling, the article not only definitively settles an ongoing debate but also brings excitement and distinction to known methods.Sonia Sabnis (chair) Alain Gowing Matthew FarmerThe Thirty-fourth Annual Best Article Prize of $1,000 will be awarded for the best article to appear in the Journal in 2022. The Press would like to thank the members of the committee for their time and effort.William M. Breichner, Journals PublisherJohns Hopkins University PressCopyright © 2022 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This article reports original research examining characteristics of the active followers of the American animal rights movement. Typical respondents were Caucasian, highly educated urban professional women approximately thirty years old with a median income of $33,000. Most activists think of themselves as Democrats or as Independents, and have moderate to liberal political views. They were often suspicious of science and made no distinctions between basic and applied science, or public versus private animal-based research. The research suggests that animal rights activism (...) is in part a symbolic manifestation of egalitarian social and political views concerning scientific and technological change. (shrink)

Medicine and health are surprisingly separate. In the introduction to his 1963 master work on medical economics, Kenneth Arrow acknowledged that “the subject is the medical-care industry, not health.” In the 50 years that followed, researchers, policymakers, and public health professionals generated valuable and varied insights into health, impacting both behaviors and environments while addressing social determinants and demographic trends. Yet medical care has followed an even steeper upward trajectory, growing rapidly in scientific precision, public esteem, and technical sophistication.As a (...) result, the economic gap between the two domains has widened. The U.S. health care system spends almost $3 trillion annually. Preventive screening and early intervention bridge medical care and health, as do nutrition, behavioral health, aging, and a few other fields. But the money is overwhelmingly in medical care, particularly rescue care for those with acute illnesses or serious complications of chronic disease. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:James J. Gibson's Ecological Approach:Perceiving What ExistsWilliam M. Mace (bio)Environmental Philosophy and EpistemologyThe purpose of this paper is to help an audience attracted to environmental philosophy get to the core of Gibson's system in a compact form and to appreciate the necessity for an account of the environment in epistemology. I hope to show that Gibson's is a consistent and scientifically progressive account of knowing that gives the environment (...) its due and that this is not a simple matter of fiat but a call to extended scientific investigation. I want to stress that Gibson's work is scientifically progressive in the sense that it has consistently opened new avenues for research. If one could be assured tomorrow that Gibson was correct and his critics wrong, the ecological psychology enterprise would not have to be shut down with nothing left to do. The goal of the enterprise, certainly for Gibson, was not to be declared a winner but to open doors for discovery. Because Gibson has developed a theory of perceiving the environment, it would be worth exploring as an important topic for environmental philosophers covering a wide range of issues. It offers an intriguing, environmentally based, grounding for epistemology; it offers ways to deal [End Page 195] with practical issues within "pure science"; and it is open to reorganizing ways to conceptualize problems beyond epistemology.Gibson developed a richly articulated system that grew steadily over a period of 50 years, 1929 to 1979, which he devoted to "puzzling over" the "perplexities" of vision (1979, xiii). From Gibson's standpoint, knowledge begins with perception, and perception is perceiving the environment. The environment, for Gibson, is at least as essential as the brain to the existence and exercise of "the mind."As an empiricist, knowledge is based on perception for Gibson. But perception, at root, turns out to be perception of the environment. Entities like sense data and representations become "after the fact" curiosities for Gibson, and have no role to play in the foundations of perceptual experience and, a fortiori, knowledge. If Gibson is correct, then scientific accounts of perception must converge on environmental perception. A philosopher whose primary focus is epistemology, and who works within Gibson's system, would perforce be an environmental philosopher—not (first) because of a special concern for the environment, but because an adequate appreciation of relevant facts requires it. Of great importance to environmental philosophers is that Gibson not only provides an account of perceiving grounded in access to environmental properties, but he establishes a basis for perceiving this particular world as a specific arrangement of surfaces. The world we perceive, according to Gibson, is a connected, public world that we share. It is, again, the world, the logical individual world and not an abstraction. This is not an account of the experience of abstract shapes, distances, and motions. It is a system in which travelers can visit the pyramids and in which I can trip over your garbage.Is there a symmetric direction of influence? Just as a commitment to understanding knowledge scientifically and philosophically can lead one to focal considerations of the environment, could a deep concern for the environment as a value lead to the serious study of perception and, more broadly, epistemology? It seems entirely plausible. Gibson's is a "yin and yang" system of scientific complementarities beginning with animal and environment and extending to knowledge and value (in his concept of affordance). In each complementarity, the terms are differentiable but not entirely independent. Animals and their environments are different entities and should not be confused with one another, but they also are so [End Page 196] mutually dependent that one should not imagine a thorough account of one without the other. In like manner, objects and value (first through use) are not independently comprehensible in Gibson's system. This is a theme worthy of careful examination of detailed examples. I am not doing that in this paper, but hope that enough of the flavor of Gibson's work will come through to allow a reader to understand how one might be steered to epistemology from an initial concern with environment and values and... (shrink)

Although at first glance, “facts” are the paradigms of straightforwardness, something about facts seems to invite perpetual controversy and dichotomizing. Innumerable bifurcations on the topic have included "Facts vs. Theories”, “Facts vs. Appearance”, "Facts vs. Values", ... and, popular nowadays, "(Real)Facts vs. Fake Facts". This paper most aligns with the facts vs. theories model, so far as whatever facts are, theories seem to be constructed stories that are necessary for connecting and interpreting the facts. Yet the boundary between the two (...) is fluid and fuzzy: Fact in one context is theory in another, depending on what is being accepted or contested at the time. This paper’s views are compatible with—but neutral on the plausibility of having—an optimism like Peirce’s that scientific inquiry may nonetheless converge towards a consensus. To illustrate the challenges of finding “straightforward” facts, the paper includes a case example, related to research on possible health effects of exposure to electromagnetic-field radiation (EMF). _ The source paper for this 2018 update was originally presented at the University of Waterloo 30th Anniversary Philosophy Conference, 1993. (shrink)

Essays on stem cell policy seem to fall into three categories. Some essays in this collection are about logic and principles. Others are about practices and beliefs. The former group draws lines and defends them, a normative project. The latter group attempts to explain the lines that already exist, a descriptive project that may have important normative goals. Still other essays, by scientists, are about growing stem cell lines instead of drawing them.The purpose of this essay is to situate the (...) lines being drawn around stem cell science in the larger landscape of health policy. I am interested in the things that cause health policy to take particular directions and the consequences of those directions for cost, access, and quality — all of which are determined in part by biomedical innovations such as those potentially derived from stem cells. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the appropriate analogy for “understanding what makes simulation results reliable” in Global Climate Modeling is not with scientific experimentation or measurement, but—at least in the case of the use of global climate models for policy development—with the applications of science in engineering design problems. The prospects for using this analogy to argue for the quantitative reliability of GCMs are assessed and compared with other potential strategies.

Tracing the evolution of political conversations about health care spending and their relationship to the formation of policy is a valuable exercise. Health care spending is about science and ethics, markets and government, freedom and community. By the late 1980s the unique upward trajectory of post-Medicare U.S. health care spending had been established, recessions and tax cuts were eroding federal and state budgets, and efforts to harness market forces to serve policy goals were accelerating. From the initial writings on “managed (...) competition,” through the failed Clinton health reform effort in the early 1990s, to the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, the policy narrative of health spending acquired a superficial consistency. On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that the cost problem has been repeatedly reframed in political discourse even during this relatively brief period. The clearest transition has been from a narrative centered on rationing necessary care to one committed to reducing wasteful care – although the role of accumulated law and regulation in perpetuating waste remains largely unrecognized and the recently articulated commitment to population health seems an imperfect proxy for explicitly developing social solidarity with respect to health and health care in the United States. (shrink)

The Introduction begins with a discussion of the misalignment in higher education between the expanded aims of many institutions and the actual organization of their learning. Three key elements of the Lilly Endowment’s Program on the Theological Exploration of Vocation is examined in this context: the theme of vocation and its integration of curricular and co-curricular learning to address the “whole student,” practices of reflection drawn from different religious traditions and their successful adaptation by the vocation programs, and the educative (...) power of learning communities comprising students, faculty, and staff. The Introduction concludes with an overview of the research project on which the book is based, along with an outline of the arc of argument that spans the following chapters. (shrink)

In the face of continuing assumptions by many scientists and journal editors that p-values provide a gold standard for inference, counter warnings are published periodically. But the core problem is not with p-values, per se. A finding that “p-value is less than α” could merely signal that a critical value has been exceeded. The question is why, when estimating a parameter, we provide a range (a confidence interval), but when testing a hypothesis about a parameter (e.g. µ = x) we (...) proceed as if “=” entails exact equality of the parameter with x. That standard is hard to meet, and is not a standard expected for power calculations, where we are satisfied to reject a null hypothesis H0 if the result is merely “detectably” different from (exact) H0. This paper explores, with resampling (simulation) methods, the impacts on p-values, and alternatives, if the null hypothesis is defined as a thick or thin range of values. It also examines, empirically, the extent to which the p-value may or may not be a good predictor of the probability that H0 is true, given the distribution of the data. (shrink)